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ABSTRACT 
 
The acceptability of gay rights (specifically same-sex marriage) at the individual level is 
constantly changing and this is revealed in the changing attitudes among states that have 
legalized same-sex marriage (37 states and the District of Columbia as of February14, 2015). 
Current research shows that familiarity plays a part in increased acceptability of gay rights and 
same-sex marriage and also shows evangelical religiosity and authoritarianism as deterrents to 
acceptance.  This thesis shows that familiarity is the strongest of the three variables and that 
religiosity and authoritarianism do affect acceptability, but only when familiarity is low.  Using 
questions from the 2012 National Election Study that address familiarity, acceptability of various 
areas gay rights, authoritarianism and religiosity, I analyzed and tested the variables to determine 
if these variables correlate in rising together or falling together.   I found that increased 
familiarity does increase acceptability of same-sex marriage.  I also found that evangelical 
religiosity and/or authoritarianism do lead to lower levels of acceptance.  However, when a 
respondent knew someone who is gay, a higher level of religiosity or authoritarianism didn’t 
appear to affect acceptability.   Therefore, familiarity appears to be the stronger variable even 
when religiosity and authoritarianism are considered.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Egalitarianism is a characteristic most Americans will agree is part of our evolving 
national heritage. Civil rights movements for African-Americans, women, Latinos, Muslims, and 
the “worker” have changed and brought with them new protections against discrimination.  
In recent years, civil rights for gays and lesbians (specifically same-sex marriage) have taken a 
prominent position in the national conversation in the United States.  Some view this as the next 
step in our civil rights conversation while others see it as an immoral and destructive lifestyle 
that is bent on hurting what they view as “traditional America.” Regardless of one’s view, 
greater recognition for gays and lesbians seems to be on the rise, especially in the area of 
marriage. 
 In 2003, Massachusetts was the only state to have legal same-sex marriage. Since then, 
thirty-six more states have legalized along with the District of Columbia. The remaining thirteen 
states with bans are largely in the south (Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Tennessee, and Texas) but Michigan, Missouri, North and South Dakota, Nebraska and Ohio 
represent the north and Midwest.  Twelve of these states have bans through both constitutional 
amendments and state law, whereas only Nebraska defines its prohibition of same-sex marriage 
solely through an amendment.  In 2009, only six states had legal same-sex marriage, so it is clear 
that there is some level of increased acceptance over time. It should be noted that court decisions, 
largely citing equal protection, overturned twenty-six of the thirty-seven state bans which is not 
necessarily indicative of a change in public opinion.  Eight state legislatures legalized these 
unions through state statutes, and three states overturned bans by popular vote (ProCon.org).  
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 At the federal level, Washington D.C. legalized same-sex marriage when the Council of 
the District of Columbia passed legislation and Mayor Adrian Fenty signed it. Following a 
mandatory review by Congress, marriage licenses were issued in the District beginning March 3, 
2010 (ProCon.org).  The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was passed in 1993 defining 
marriage as a union between a man and a woman.  Twenty years later, on June 26, 2013, the U.S. 
Supreme Court  (U.S. v. Windsor 2013) overturned section 3 of DOMA as it violated equal 
protection for same-sex couples in over 1000 federal statutes.   
 For decades, there was little conversation about same-sex marriage even as gay and 
lesbian culture in general was becoming more accepted through the television media and 
Hollywood celebrities.  The more recent upsurge in support for same-sex marriage and gay rights 
in general, could reflect both a shift in aggregate public opinion and potentially, in our culture.  
What has effected these aggregate changes likely began at the individual level and is the subject 
of extensive research.   
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Scholars have studied age, religion, familiarity, political ideology and authoritarianism as 
factors that affect individual attitudes toward gay rights and specifically same-sex marriage.   
Examining these factors can contribute to a better understanding of the overall shift in 
acceptability toward gay rights as well as why some states and regions have not gravitated 
toward greater acceptability.  
 
Familiarity (Social Contact with Gays and Lesbians) 
 Scholars, including Amy Becker and Dietram A. Scheufele, continue to focus on 
numerous factors that could explain the dramatic shifts in more acceptability of gays and lesbians 
marrying.  Recent research has suggested that increased familiarity with gay friends or family 
members positively affects attitudes toward same-sex marriage. One key factor is the familiarity 
with a close friend or family member rather than an acquaintance.  Younger generations are more 
likely to be accepting of gays and lesbians. Becker says, “Given fewer obstacles for younger 
individuals looking to come out of the closet and be more open about their sexual orientation, it 
makes sense that younger generations in particular should have more social contact with gays 
and lesbians” (Becker 2012).  A 2006 report suggests that teenagers are choosing to “come out,” 
on the average, at age 13.  (Becker and Scheufele 2011). Also, as younger voters “replace” older 
voters, we are seeing a more noticeable shift in public opinion favoring same-sex marriage. 
There are some questions as to whether this is due to “increasing rates of social contact” or just 
“generational replacement.” Becker uses data from the Pew Research Center’s January 2010 
Millennial Survey which interviewed 2020 adults in the United States. Her results showed that 
social contact, attitudes toward same-sex parent families, and support for same-sex marriage all 
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varied dramatically across generations (Millienials were more positive compared with baby 
boomers).  Their results confirm that “age, or generational affiliation, is inversely related to issue 
support, and that Millennials have the highest rates of social contact with gays and lesbians, the 
most liberal attitudes toward same-sex parent families, and show the broadest support for same-
sex marriage…rates of social contact are an important predictor of support for same-sex 
marriage irrespective of generational cohort membership” (Becker 2012) Even though the 
younger generation appears to be more supportive of the shift toward legalized same-sex 
marriage, this can’t be attributed purely to “simple generational replacement.”  
 
Age and Gender Affect Familiarity 
 Age and gender also seem to play a role in both one’s level of familiarity and therefore 
their level of support for same-sex marriage. In a 2011 study, Becker and Scheufele use age 
cohorts as their variable to see the factors that mold public acceptance of homosexuality and 
same-sex marriage.  They used data from two national surveys, and their research suggests that 
familiarity has a larger effect on the attitudes of younger respondents which influences their 
acceptance of same-sex marriage in a positive manner.  Alternatively, religion and ideology have 
a greater effect on the attitudes of older respondents.  Younger people tended to have “higher 
levels of deliberative engagement with the issue debate, while older individuals rely more 
heavily on their predispositions when determining issue stance” (Becker and Scheufele 2011). In 
2008, 49% of those under the age of 30 responded positively in support of gay marriage where 
67% of those age 65 and older opposed legalizing it.  Women are more likely to support gay 
marriage over men, which is thought to be affected by a higher level of familiarity with people 
who openly identify themselves as being gay.  More specifically, 47% of women compared to 
  
11 
35% of men report they have a close friend or family member who is gay or lesbian.  This study 
suggests, as do others, that familiarity and growing personal contact with gays and lesbians is 
“directly related to higher levels of political tolerance and greater support for policies like same-
sex marriage.”  Becker and Scheufele speculate that with this direct effect, the “Obama 
generation” may be more likely to grow in its tolerance toward gays and lesbians given its 
increased contact with gays and lesbians through its “social networks.” As an aside, media 
exposure does not appear to have a major effect on either group suggesting that other factors play 
a larger role on public opinion (Becker and Scheufele 2011). 
  
Religion and Ideology Affect Acceptability  
 A 2008 Pew Research Study confirms previous research that shows “more religious 
individuals, defined as those who attend church more frequently and have a more devout sense of 
doctrinal commitment, are significantly less tolerant of gay men and lesbians” (Becker and 
Scheufele 2011).  Furthermore, there is evidence connecting “conservative ideological 
orientations, religiosity, and opposition to same-sex marriage…83% of conservative Republicans 
and 73% of more religious individuals oppose gay marriage, compared to 26% of liberal 
Democrats and 43% of less religious individuals who oppose gay marriage”  (Becker and 
Scheufele 2011).  Studies also reveal that religiosity can influence a person’s level of political 
participation, especially when the issue is a “pressing moral matter” or the clergy has called on 
people to be involved.  
 Andrew Garner uses religion more as a moderating variable inside the larger 
“conservative-leaning” or “liberal-leaning” voter.  He, like Becker and Scheufele, looks at the 
effect that contact or familiarity with gays/lesbians has on citizens’ attitudes toward gay rights, 
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but applied this “contact” study to both conservative-leaning (evangelical Christians, strong 
conservatives, and strong Republicans) and liberal-leaning citizens and found that contact can 
create an “ambivalence” among strong conservative-leaning citizens and cause “internal conflict 
between their political values and their contact with gays and lesbians.”  Because of this conflict, 
their behavior is less predictable.  He also found that contact or familiarity with gays/lesbians for 
liberal-leaning citizens creates the opposition effect thus “reducing ambivalence and making 
their attitudes more predictable and uniform.”  Contact with gays/lesbians does impact the “mean 
level of support for gay rights, as well as the clarity or certainty of those attitudes, although its 
effect differs across these two dimensions of public opinion.” As gay rights groups work to 
stabilize attitudes and increase support for same-sex marriage, this unpredictability could pose a 
problem for these groups making it difficult for them to advance their mission of acceptance. 
(Garner 2013)   
 Like Garner, Poteat and Mereish look at the differences between conservatives and 
liberals as they apply to same-sex marriage (and abortion) and focus specifically on identifying 
the “factors that moderated attitude differences.”  They acknowledge that a lot of research exists 
about the differences between liberals and conservatives, but there is not much attention to how 
much these differences can vary within the ideology itself.  They narrow their variables to 
include group identity strength, issue relevance, and attitude strength along with ambivalence to 
an issue.  This is important to the greater research community as ideology and party 
identification continue to play a role in attitude toward same-sex marriage.  Poteat and Mereish 
help to more narrowly define what it means to be conservative and liberal in this particular 
context, though not all typical descriptors are included. (Poteat and Mereish 2012.) 
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Evangelical Religiosity/Morality Affect Acceptability 
 Dawn Baunach’s research echoes Becker and Scheufele’s, but covers a more specific 
period between 1988 and 2010. She uses the General Social Survey (2011) and found the more 
traditional characteristics thought to affect opinions of same-sex marriage adversely (Republican, 
living in the southern part of the United States, evangelical Protestant Christian, and being 
African American) all are connected with attitudes in recent years whereas in 1988, opposition to 
same-sex marriage was higher for all groups.  Those classified as highly educated, urban, less 
religious, or less conservative did have lower disapproval responses, but all showed significantly 
lower approval for same-sex marriage than all groups in 2010.  Her “decomposition analysis 
finds that changing same-sex marriage attitudes are not due to demographic changes in the 
American population. Rather, the liberalization in same-sex marriage attitudes from 1988-2010 
is due primarily to a general societal change in attitudes…reflecting a cultural shift.” (Baunach 
2012)   
 Baunach’s research also reveals that religiosity seems to have a dramatic affect on same-
sex marriage attitudes across all years of the survey, specifically for evangelical Protestants.  
Though it affects all years, it is stronger in the later years with the growth of evangelicalism 
nationally.  Political party also has a strong influence, more so in the later years with the 
alignment of the Republican Party against same-sex marriage as a morality issue.  Of all the 
variables she considered, only gender and education are consistent over all of the years surveyed.  
All others influence attitudes toward same-sex marriage only in the later years.  Religion 
continues to “be a brake on full acceptance, and the combination of politics and religion has 
particular impact on views in 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010” (Baunach 2012.)  With this, Baunach 
goes on to make an interesting point:  just as conservative politicians used their opposition to 
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same-sex marriage to embolden their base, the increased attention to the issue could have 
encouraged the public to think more about it and indirectly encourage them to increase their 
familiarity with the idea and increase their tolerance of the issue (Baunach 2012). 
 The high level of opposition to same-sex marriage in 1988 across the variables could be 
due to a lack of any familiarity.  By 2004 this opposition was more “localized to specific 
subgroups—older Americans, southerners, African Americans, evangelical Protestants, and 
Republicans.” Baunach does caution that because she used secondary data, some measures 
necessary to understanding some of these attitudes might not have been available. (Baunach 
2012)  
 Baunach has also looked at “decomposing trends” considering specific media frames 
(morality and equality or tolerance.) Her 2011 study used several subgroups across the United 
States including age, sex, place of residence, education and religious groups in the data and 
posits that “equality/tolerance” framing of same-sex marriage helped to move public opinion to a 
more tolerant state.  “When it comes to gay marriage, two media frames have been in 
competition—a ‘morality’ frame and an ‘equality’ or ‘tolerance’ frame” (Baunach 2011). The 
morality frame describes gay marriage as a threat to traditional family values where the 
equality/tolerance frame looks at gay marriage as a civil rights issue.  Interestingly the civil 
rights frame started the gay rights conversation, and it wasn’t until 1977 that the first anti-gay 
movement began and using religion, tradition and morality to challenge the civil rights framing.  
Things like the HIV/AIDS epidemic, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, ” DOMA, and the 2000 and 2004 
elections, strengthened the morality frame where the 1998 murder of Matthew Shepard, various 
television programs and movies featuring gay characters, the movement away from HIV/AIDS 
being a “gay disease,” and various celebrities “coming out” all pushed more attention to the 
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equality frame.  Baunach’s research doesn’t focus on organized movements for or against gay 
marriage, but rather “on attitudes toward gay marriage, which may respond to messages in the 
public discourse, particularly frames, as well as events and other cultural developments.”  
 Interestingly, Baunach’s research shows an attitudinal shift toward equality with 
increased exposure through the media where Becker’s seems to show little effect by the media. 
(Baunach 2011)  Regardless, Becker, Scheufele and Baunach’s recent research could be the 
beginning of a clearer understanding of how overall familiarity with same-sex couples increases 
acceptance of homosexuality and same-sex marriage. 
  Susan Gaines and James C. Garand’s research focuses on the determinants of support for 
same-sex marriage, looking specifically at morality (defined by religion), belief in same-sex 
marriage as a civil right, and living near a greater number of same-sex couples (a proxy for 
familiarity).  In this study, the authors examined several determinants of attitudes about same-sex 
marriage in the United States. First they looked at religion as a variable and saw depressed 
support for those identifying themselves as religious (i.e.: religiosity, evangelical religious 
beliefs, and church attendance.) They also found that those who “are active members of 
traditional Christian churches, and are adherents to more conservative religious faiths will tend to 
resist changes in traditional moral values and will hence be opposed to departures from the 
traditional heterosexual marital form” (Gaines and Garand 2010).  The authors also looked at 
connections between support for civil rights for women and African Americans and support for 
same-sex marriage rights.  “The key question is whether individuals see support for same-sex 
marriage in a manner similar to how they view equal rights for blacks and women.”  Their 
findings do not suggest that this is the case.  Some groups have “framed” same-sex marriage as a 
civil rights issue, but this frame or view does not seem to be the lens used by the public at large.  
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Lastly, they explored evidence that suggested that people are more likely to support same-sex 
marriage if they live in localities with larger number of same-sex couples.  There was little 
evidence “to support the inference of a direct effect of context on individuals’ attitudes toward 
same-sex marriage.”  But the empirical evidence suggests “effects for the small subset of 
individuals who reside in counties with a percentage of same-sex partnered households that is 
more than one standard deviation above the mean on this variable.  For these individuals, there is 
a strong interaction effect for attitudes toward gays and lesbians on one hand, and the percentage 
of same-sex partnered households in their home county, on the other.” (Gaines and Garand 2010) 
 Andrew Whitehead brings a new variable into the religion discussion with his research 
associated with the belief that homosexuals choose their orientation, rather than it being 
biologically determined. In his findings, “religion is strongly associated with the belief that 
homosexuals choose their sexual orientation…[and] religion maintains a significant association 
with attitudes toward same-sex unions despite inclusion of an attribution variable…Even if a 
biological explanation for homosexuality is ultimately proven, unfavorable attitudes toward 
same-sex unions will most likely endure due to religion’s persistent effect.” (Whitehead 2010)  It 
should be noted that the religious variables he uses are attendance, belief in biblical literalism 
and perceived images of God (God as an “angry God”), and denominational affiliation.  To 
control for affiliation, he uses a modified RELTRAD or religious traditions theme where 
individuals are put into the following categories: black Protestant, evangelical Protestant, 
mainline Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, other religion, and no religion.  (Steensland et al 2000) 
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Religion and Race/Ethnicity Affect Acceptability 
 Ellison, Acevedo, and Ramos-Wada focus their research on religion and attitudes toward 
same-sex marriage but with a caveat toward ethnicity.  They narrowed their subset to include 
only Latinos.  Though public opinion of same-sex marriage is the subject of much research at 
present, one area often neglected is the opinion/attitude of Latino/a Americans concerning same-
sex marriage.  This oversight is noteworthy, as Hispanic Americans have passed African 
Americans as the largest minority group. And, despite the fact that Latino Americans tend to 
have Democratic leanings, they are also culturally conservative and one could presume they 
would have negative attitudes toward same-sex marriage.  Also, assumptions are sometimes 
made that most Latinos are Catholic while in fact, U.S. Hispanics make up approximately one-
fourth of U.S. Protestants, and most of these are conservative (Ellison, Acevedo & Ramos-Wada 
2011) According to the Pew Research Center’s 2013 National Survey of Latinos and Religion, 
55% of the nation’s thirty-five million Latinos identify as Catholic while 22% identify as 
Protestant (16% of these being evangelical or “born again.”)  Ellison, Acevedo & Ramos-Wada 
examine variations in religious attitudes and public policy preferences among Hispanics in the 
area of homosexual rights and same-sex marriage. They look at belief in scripture, “cues” from 
clergy, and the role of religiosity in helping to form political ideas.    
 Interestingly they find that Catholic Latino Americans tend to “hold more moderate 
views of same-sex marriage than conservative Protestants [and] opinions of same-sex marriage 
vary widely among mainline Protestants.”  For Hispanic evangelical Protestants, frequency of 
church attendance and a literal interpretation of the Bible do not seem to play a part (unlike 
studies of evangelical Protestant non-Hispanic whites.)  They had limited data examining “the 
role of beliefs about the causes of homosexuality, which may account for at least part of the 
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conservative Protestant ‘effect’ on same-sex marriage attitudes.”  For Hispanic Catholics, church 
attendance does seem to affect views of same-sex marriage where those who regularly attend 
Catholic services tend to oppose same-sex marriage by two to one to those less devout. (Ellison, 
Acevedo & Ramos-Wada 2011)  
 Sherkat, de Vries, and Creek also examine race and religion as variables toward 
acceptability of same-sex marriage.  Where Ellison, Acevedo and Ramos-Wada looked at the 
Latino population, Sherkat, de Vries, and Creek “examine racial differences in support for same-
sex marriage, and test whether the emerging black-white gap is a function of religiosity” (2010).  
They find that African Americans tied to sectarian Protestant religious denominations who have 
a high rate of church attendance tend to oppose same-sex marriage, and that other more secular 
influences appear to have less impact in forming beliefs about same-sex marriage among the 
African American community. Alternatively, Caucasians seem to be affected from both 
religiosity and secular influences. (Sherkat, de Vries, Creek 2010)  Like Ellison, Acevedo and 
Ramos-Wada’s findings, race does seem to be an indicator when religion is also a variable.  For 
them, however, the Latino religious population consisted of both Catholic and Protestant.  
 
Authoritarianism and Attitudes Toward Gay Rights and Same-Sex Marriage 
 Though the scholarly literature on authoritarianism is extensive, Hetherington and Weiler 
focus their attention on a few characteristics associated with authoritarianism that are particularly 
significant to understanding political conflict in today’s American politics.  They first describe 
people inclined toward authoritarianism in this way: “Those who score high in authoritarianism 
tend to have a different cognitive style than those who score low.  The former tend to view the 
world in more concrete, black and white terms…This is probably because a they have a greater 
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than average need for order.  In contrast, those who score lower in authoritarianism have more 
comfort with ambiguous shades of gray, which allow for more nuanced judgments…those who 
are more authoritarian embrace and work to protect existing social norms.” (Hetherington and 
Weiler 2009)  In their work, Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics, the authors 
show distinct connections between those scoring high on the authoritarian scale as having a lack 
of acceptance of same-sex marriage (and most all gay rights for that matter.)  Those scoring 
lower on the scale are more accepting or have no opinion.  Using data from the 2004 National 
Election Study (NES), Hetherington and Weiler show that those identified as authoritarian at 
minimum showed 71% in support of gay marriage while those showing authoritarian at 
maximum had only 19% support.  Authoritarianism “ought to structure preferences involving 
groups that challenge established norms, as gays and lesbians do…It appears, however, that once 
an issue becomes a relatively established practice, even those with the greatest concerns about 
difference will come to accept that change.”  It should be noted that “[the] deepening of the 
authoritarian cleavage in contemporary American politics is caused more by a change in the 
opinions and behaviors of nonauthoritarians than those of authoritarians …authoritarians’ 
assessments tend to remain relatively constant over time.  It is those at the other end of the scale 
who show variation.”   People can show opposition for gay marriage for reasons that do not have 
their origins in “intolerance of difference caused by a need for order.”  However, even when 
controlling for a wide range of variables, the relationship between authoritarianism and support 
for gay rights is statistically significant.  (Hetherington and Weiler 2009).   
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Initial Conclusions From Literature 
 Numerous factors affect acceptability of same-sex marriage on an individual level.  
Religion appears to be the strongest indicator though it should be noted that conservative 
evangelical Christians are less accepting of same-sex behavior and marriage whereas mainline 
Christians have more accepting attitudes.  Therefore there is likely an ordering of acceptance 
between religious groups, and Christianity in and of itself is not an indicator of more or less 
acceptance.  Familiarity or contact with same-sex couples also appears to play a large role in 
acceptance and seems to be woven throughout the research. However, in areas where you control 
for conservative Protestant religion, the level of approval does not seem to go up.  This could be 
why states with a large population of conservative evangelicals have not moved in the direction  
of protecting marriage rights for same-sex couples.  In fact, most of these states have either 
passed legislation defining marriage as between one man and one woman or they have passed 
constitutional amendments that do the same.   
 Whitehead’s research that explores the belief that people choose to be homosexual as 
opposed to homosexuality as a biologically determined phenomenon, adds a new explanation to 
conservative evangelicals’ unwillingness to accept homosexuality or same-sex marriage rights 
(Whitehead 2010). Ideology, gender, education, age, and race also play a role in acceptance.  
Those who identify with more liberal principles seem to be more accepting of same-sex marriage 
while those with more conservative principles do not.  Women are more likely to change their 
attitudes to more positively view gay rights and same-sex marriage, especially after more contact 
with same-sex couples and same-sex couples with children.  Men are not as affected by this 
familiarity.   
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 Age cohort succession is also an indicator of acceptance of same-sex marriage in the 
aggregate.  As older people who identify as more traditional are dying, younger people who are 
more likely to have a friend or close family member who is gay are replacing them.  Becker 
refers to these “Millenials” as the “Obama generation” and sees their new social networks as 
another path to familiarity. (Becker 2012)  Race and ethnicity are also indicators of an attitudinal 
shift when controlling for religion. African Americans and Latinos tend to view same-sex 
marriage less favorably but this seems to be not a racial distinction but rather that so many 
African Americans and Latinos align with more conservative evangelical religious beliefs.  
Finally, according to Hetherington and Weiler, one’s level of authoritarianism proves to be a 
statistically significant indicator of their likelihood of acceptance of same-sex marriage as this 
new institution is a challenge to social norms and potentially a threat to one’s traditional sense of 
“order.”  A higher level of authoritarianism shows a reduced level of acceptance of same-sex 
marriage and a lower level allows for greater acceptance. 
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RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
When you control for evangelical religiosity and authoritarianism, how does familiarity affect 
the acceptability of gay rights and of specifically same-sex marriage? 
 
THEORY 
 Scholars have examined numerous variables that may or may not affect the acceptability 
of same-sex marriage and gay rights in general.  Race, religion, gender, political party, and 
political ideology have all been shown to affect individual attitudes. The specific variable 
focused on here is familiarity (or contact) but when factoring in evangelical religiosity and 
authoritarianism. There is significant research showing that familiarity encourages a greater 
acceptability of gays and lesbians.  There is also research that shows conservative or evangelical 
religiosity and a high level of authoritarianism as strong variables that lead to a lower level of 
acceptance of gay rights.  This research posits that familiarity does increase acceptability except 
when evangelical religiosity or authoritarianism is factored into the equation.  Though there are 
several other variables in addition to familiarity used to examine attitudes toward gay rights and 
same-sex marriage in the studies cited earlier (race, ideology, gender, and ideology), the two that 
would appear to have the greatest effect are religiosity and authoritarianism.  Further explanation 
of all the variables used in this research is necessary to better understand the relationship theory.   
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DATA 
 The ANES 2012 Time Series Study is the source of data for this research.  Data 
collection began in early September 2012 and continued into January of 2013. Pre and post-
election interviews were conducted with respondents, and the study asked questions of 
individuals across the fifty states and the District of Columbia with a total number of respondents 
of over 4,400.  
 Using this data, there are two groups of dependent variables in this research, both of 
which measure acceptance of gays and lesbians.  The first dependent variable is an additive scale 
that combines the respondent’s answers to four questions encompassing different areas of 
acceptability of gay rights.  These include gays in the military, gay marriage, gay adoption and 
gay discrimination laws (Appendix).  The second is a single dependent variable that measures 
acceptability of gay or same-sex marriage only.  To be clear, acceptability of same-sex marriage 
is defined as acceptance of two people of the same gender entering into a marital agreement, and 
does not reference a civil union or domestic partnership.  Using the additive scale variable 
provides richer data, but testing the theory using the single marriage variable alone is also 
appropriate. 
 Of most importance in this research are three independent variables:  familiarity, 
evangelical religiosity, and authoritarianism.  Familiarity or “contact” is time spent with a close 
friend or family member who is gay or in a homosexual relationship. This variable is measured 
singularly as either knowing or not knowing a friend or family member who is gay, and also as 
an interaction term where the root variable is multiplied by the ‘know someone who is gay’ 
variable. These show how the affect of an independent variable like income or age can change 
based on knowing someone who is gay.  Evangelical religiosity is another additive scale variable 
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that sums the respondent’s answers to several religiosity questions including identification as a 
Christian, being a ‘born-again’ Christian, using religion as a guide in daily living, importance of 
religion in one’s life, frequency of prayer, Biblical literalism, and church attendance (Appendix).  
The authoritarianism variable uses a summary score of four questions regularly asked of 
respondents to measure level of authoritarianism. These questions, which are specifically about 
children, concern obedience, manners, consideration, and respect. (Appendix). 
 In addition to the three independent variables, there are eight control variables in this 
research:  gender, race, ethnicity, party identification, ideology, income, age, and education. 
Though the focus of this research is not on these controls, they appear to reveal some interesting 
results when combined with the aforementioned ‘know’ variable.  The variables are largely 
ordinal as many of the questions ask for a range of opinion (i.e.: strongly approve…strongly 
disapprove) though some are nominal (gender, age, income).  
 When data analysis is complete, it is expected that acceptability of gay rights/ same-sex 
marriage will rise when contact with homosexual or same-sex couples (familiarity) rises. 
However, it is also expected if the respondent scores high in religiosity or authoritarianism, 
his/her acceptability of same-sex marriage will be low, regardless of level of familiarity. 
Ultimately, where there is higher religiosity and/or authoritarianism, it is expected that 
acceptability of same-sex marriage will be low, even if familiarity appears to high according to 
the other responses given.  
 A linear regression is appropriate when examining the combined dependent variables of 
acceptability of gay rights, but an ordered probit regression is better for the single acceptability 
of same-sex marriage dependent variable.  
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RESULTS 
 For all interaction terms in this research, knowing someone who is gay contributed to a 
higher level of acceptability of gay rights.  Not knowing someone who is gay generally showed a 
lower level of acceptance.  Though these results varied among the different terms, familiarity 
appeared to contribute to a greater acceptability of gay rights across the variables.  This is 
consistent with the first part of this research theory. 
 As expected, respondents with a higher level of religiosity had much less acceptance of 
gay rights than those with little to no religiosity (Figure 1).  Those with little to no religiosity 
appeared to accept gay rights with or without knowing someone who is gay and those with a 
higher level of religiosity appeared to have little acceptance for gay rights regardless of 
familiarity.  It should be noted that familiarity did drive up acceptability but only slightly (0.88 to 
1.07). Contact or familiarity with a gay person did not have a statistically significant impact on 
acceptability of gay rights among those with a high level of religiosity.    
               
                                      Lower religiosity                  Higher religiosity 
Figure 1: Religiosity and Familiarity 
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 Similar to religiosity, it was expected that respondents who scored higher on the 
authoritarianism scale would be less accepting of gay rights, and the data supported this (Figure 
2).  However, when familiarity was factored in addition to the authoritarianism variable, 
knowing someone who is gay did not have a large effect on one’s acceptance of gay rights.  
Strong authoritarians scored between 1.24 and 1.46 with a difference of 0.22 when considering 
contact with a person who is gay.  Those lower on the authoritarianism scale showed less effect 
with only a 0.12 difference.  Familiarity or contact with someone who is gay had some effect, but 
it was not statistically significant.  
         
  
                                        Figure 2:  Authoritarianism and Familiarity         
 
 With religiosity and authoritarianism considered, knowing someone who is gay did 
increase the level of acceptance of gay rights over those who didn’t know someone who was gay.  
However, contrary to the theory posed, when respondents scored high in religiosity or 
authoritarianism, their level of acceptance did not drop dramatically. With both variables, the 
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lines between those who know someone who is gay and those who did not were parallel showing 
little effect from the dependent variables.  Familiarity matters but only slightly and was 
unaffected by religiosity or authoritarianism. 
 In addition to religiosity and authoritarianism, several other variables were considered in 
this research to see their interactions with knowing someone who is gay and how that affected a 
respondent’s acceptability of gay rights.  As expected when considering political party 
identification (Figure 3), Republicans had a lower level of acceptability of gay rights than 
Democrats overall, and the difference between knowing and not knowing someone who is gay 
had some effect but not a lot (1.64-1.74). For Democrats, however, knowing someone who is gay 
had little effect on their acceptability of gay rights as the spread is only 0.02.  Both those who 
had familiarity with someone who is gay and those who didn’t both showed a higher level of 
acceptance of gay rights overall and those less familiar actually scored slightly higher.  
 
            Republican Party                                Democratic Party  
                                             Figure 3:  Political Party Identification and Familiarity 
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 With political ideology, the lines are almost parallel (Figure 4).  Those who responded as 
being the most conservative showed low acceptance of gay rights regardless of their familiarity 
or contact with a gay person (only 0.14 difference).  Those who responded as the most liberal 
showed the greatest acceptance though familiarity did have a little stronger effect (0.26 
difference). 
    
          Conservative          Liberal 
                                               Figure 4:  Political Ideology and Familiarity 
 When looking at how race and ethnicity affect the acceptability of gay rights, among 
those who did not know someone who is gay, Blacks had a slightly higher rate of acceptability of 
gay rights than Whites (1.58 to 1.64 with a difference of only 0.06).  Among those who knew 
someone who is gay, the acceptance rate between Whites and Blacks was the same (1.7).  
Familiarity did affect acceptance of gay rights within these two races but only slightly (0.06).  
With ethnicity (specifically Hispanic or Caucasian) knowing someone who is gay did contribute 
to a higher level of acceptance of gay rights.  Whites scored 1.7 where Hispanics were only 
slightly higher at 1.73.   For those who did not know someone who is gay, both groups scored 
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lower (1.58 for Whites and 1.63 for Hispanics.)  The lines were almost parallel, and familiarity 
with someone who is gay showed no statistical significance on acceptance when considering 
only ethnicity (Figures 5 and 6).  
                          
    White          Black 
Figure 5: Race and Familiarity 
        
    White        Hispanic 
                                                                                Figure 6:  Ethnicity and Familiarity 
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 As with the other interaction terms in this research, when considering education, those 
familiar with someone who is gay scored higher than those who reported not knowing anyone 
who is gay, regardless of level of education.  As education levels rose, acceptability of gay rights 
also rose for both groups.  Again, with the lines almost parallel, there was not a notable 
significance in how education AND familiarity affect acceptability of gay rights together (Figure 
7). 
 
                           
                             Less education                                  More education 
Figure 7:  Education and Familiarity 
  
 Though not the focus of this research, some interesting results surfaced when income was 
factored in with familiarity and measured against acceptability of gay rights.  Statistically 
significant with a p-value of 0.023 (Table 1), those with lower incomes had only a 0.17 
difference in their acceptability of gay rights when considering if the respondents knew or did 
not know someone who is gay.  However, as incomes rose, so did acceptance among those who 
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knew someone who is gay.  Acceptance of gay rights among those not knowing someone who is 
gay seemed to make no difference between those with lesser or greater income.  Those showing 
the greatest wealth and knowing someone who is gay had significantly higher rate of 
acceptability of gay rights than those of greatest wealth who did not know someone who is gay 
(0.48 difference—Figure 8.)   
               
  Lower income                Higher income 
                                                              Figure 8:  Income and Familiarity 
 
 Factoring in gender also proved to be statistically significant with a p-value of 0.042 
(Table 1). Men had less acceptance of gay rights than women overall, but knowing someone who 
is gay did raise their level of acceptance some (from 1.4 to 1.59).  For women, familiarity made 
less of an impact (only 0.12).  Women were generally more accepting regardless of whether or 
not they knew someone who is gay (Figure 9). 
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              Female            Male 
Figure 9:  Gender and Familiarity 
 
 Another interesting result came when looking at how age and familiarity together affect 
the acceptability of gay rights.  As seen in all other regressions in this research, those who know 
someone who is gay had a greater level of acceptance of gay rights than those who did not know 
someone who is gay.  What is notable here is that for those who know someone who is gay, there 
was virtually no difference in acceptability when factoring in age (score of 1.7 from ages 20-80).  
For those who did not know someone who is gay, age seemed to matter.   At age 20, respondents 
scored 1.54 but when reaching age 80, respondents showed a drop in level of acceptance to 1.42.  
Familiarity does appear to affect how older people accept gay rights, though only slightly (Figure 
10).    
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    Younger              Older 
               Figure 10:  Age and Familiarity 
 
 In examining the ordered probit regression with the acceptability of gay marriage as the 
dependent variable, none of the interactions are significant and so do not warrant much 
discussion.  The interaction term (political ideology*know someone who is gay) did have a p 
value of 0.055 but even that was not statistically significant.  As mentioned earlier, the dependent 
variable using the additive scale of various areas of gay rights provides richer data for analysis 
than the stand-alone dependent variable of just gay marriage (Table 2). 
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CONCLUSION 
 This research concludes that increased familiarity does lead to greater acceptance of gay 
rights, even when you factor in evangelical religiosity or authoritarianism.  The research theory 
predicted that religiosity and authoritarianism would be stronger variables, but they do not 
appear to be.  Respondents who scored higher in religiosity do have a lower level of acceptance 
of gay rights than those who identified as having a low level of religiosity.  And respondents who 
scored high on the authoritarianism scale also have a lower level of acceptance of gay rights than 
those who scored lower on the authoritarian scale.  Research has shown that younger respondents 
and women have greater acceptance largely due to their increased familiarity. In these two 
groups, familiarity did appear to affect acceptability, and religiosity and authoritarianism had 
little effect.  Though religiosity could affect acceptability of gay rights to a slight degree, no 
affect showed statistical significance that those religious factors weighed more heavily than 
familiarity.   
 Of the other independent “control” variables, only income and age showed statistical 
significance when combined with familiarity to measure acceptability of gay rights.  Neither of 
these variables were the focus of this research, but these results produce some interesting 
questions. Is there a relationship between having higher income and greater familiarity with 
someone who is gay?  Does having more money make it more likely that you will know 
someone who is gay?   
 Much research supports younger people being more accepting of gay rights and 
specifically gay marriage.  The age/familiarity interaction term reveals the possibility of a 
different relationship, however.  Knowing someone who is gay doesn’t affect acceptability for 
those ages 20-80.  However, for those who do not know someone who is gay, age seems to 
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matter.  Younger respondents were far more accepting of gay rights than older respondents when 
familiarity is not considered.  This seems to say that familiarity is a stronger variable than age, 
however, other controls do likely play a part.   
 One limitation of this study is the lack of questions specific to gay marriage available in 
the NES survey.  Though the additive scale dependent variable of “gay rights” gives rich data, 
more questions about gay marriage specifically would better reveal acceptability of that 
particular issue.  The ordered probit regression produced no results of statistical significance, 
which begs the question of whether or not more questions specific to gay marriage would have 
produced different results. 
 Examination of individual respondents’ personal opinions can guide researchers who 
examine aggregate public opinion.  It is assumed by many that areas of the United States with 
larger evangelical populations are resistant to increasing gay rights or legalizing same-sex 
marriage due to their religious beliefs.  The next question might be to see if these areas or states 
showing resistance to gay rights have a citizenry with a generally lower level of familiarity of 
people who identify as gay or lesbian.  As it would be unlikely that there are just lower 
populations of gay and lesbians in states with fewer gay rights, that could be due to a general 
lack of acceptance of gay rights by the community which leads many people to keep their sexual 
orientation a secret.     
 More specific to gay marriage rights, another interesting next step in the research could 
lie within those states that have legalized gay marriage.  Of the thirty-seven states that have 
legalized, only eleven did so through actions of their state legislatures or through popular vote.  
Most states had legislation in place that banned same-sex marriage, and it was only through court 
rulings that these bans were found unconstitutional.  Where bans were lifted through legislation 
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or popular vote implies a public opinion shifting toward greater acceptance, yet this applies to 
only eleven states. Furthermore, what is the level of familiarity in the remaining thirteen states 
that have yet to legalize?  Is religiosity high?  Is familiarity low? Assuming they eventually 
legalize, will it be through the courts or is public opinion shifting enough to bring it about 
through legislation or action by the people?  Nine of the thirteen are in the South where 
religiosity and authoritarianism are typically higher, but that does not speak to familiarity, which 
according to this research, appears to be the stronger variable.  Personal opinion leads to public 
opinion and public opinion leads to policy.  A closer look at aggregate public opinion about gay 
rights and how knowing someone who is gay affects how people accept gay rights can give 
researchers a better idea about the direction that policy will take in the area of gay rights and 
more specifically, gay marriage. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1.  Attitudes toward Gay Rights (Additive Scale)__ 
______________________________________________ 
Party Identification (PID)  0.0567471  (0.0068407) 
Gender    -0.1812378  (0.022644) 
Political Ideology   0.0819828  (0.0100469) 
Religiosity   -0.1981931  (0.0135939) 
Race      0.0594056 (0.0358031) 
Ethnicity     0.0490437 (0.0328286) 
Age    -0.0024732 (0.0006676) 
Education    0.0348137 (0.0108493) 
Income    0.00416 (0.0014795) 
Authoritarianism  -0.1719121 (0.0202119) 
Familiarity (Know)   0.1242149 (0.1024586) 
PID*Know   -0.0175186 (0.0105908) 
Gender*Know    0.0684896 (0.0337138) p=0.042* 
Political Ideology*Know  0.0201479 (0.0150471) 
Race*Know   -0.0589248 (0.0544806) 
Ethnicity*Know  -0.0347192 (0.0491414) 
Income*Know  -0.0051175 (0.0022465) P=0.023* 
Authoritarianism*Know  0.0473442 (0.0302225) 
Religiosity*Know   0.0196526 (0.0205817) 
Education*Know  -0.0123004 (0.0163822) 
Age*Know    0.0015058 (0.0010317) 
 
Adjusted R-Square  0.3527 
N    4413 
______________________________________________ 
Entries are OLS coefficients, followed by standard errors in parentheses. 
* = p<.05 
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Table 2.  Attitudes Toward Gay Marriage ____________ 
______________________________________________ 
Party Identification (PID)   0.0855941  (0.0148696) 
Gender     -0.2532701 (0.0498422) 
Political Ideology     0.1662895 (0.0221858) 
Religiosity    -0.500634  (0.0302627) 
Race      -0.1100006 (0.0776151) 
Ethnicity      0.0139514 (0.0716228) 
Age     -0.0065019 (0.00146) 
Education     0.0882523 (0.0237849) 
Income     0.0009464 (0.0032512) 
Authoritarianism   -0.3363167 (0.0444659) 
Familiarity (Know)    0.3994424 (0.2361639) 
PID*Know     0.0135791 (0.0235092) 
Gender*Know     0.1230634 (0.0768628) 
Political Ideology*Know   0.0656414 (0.0341588)    p=0.055 
Race*Know    -0.0606029 (0.1210067) 
Ethnicity*Know   -0.0802467 (0.111209) 
Income*Know   -0.0042618 (0.0051494) 
Authoritarianism*Know  -0.0299598 (0.0690875) 
Religiosity*Know   -0.0308795 (0.0467398) 
Age*Know    -0.0021779 (0.0023636) 
Education*Know   -0.0156262 (0.0371458) 
 
N    4397 
______________________________________________ 
Entries are OLS coefficients, followed by standard errors in parentheses. 
* = p<.05 
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APPENDIX – ANES SURVEY QUESTIONS 
This appendix includes all questions from the 2012 ANES study used in this research and how 
each question was recoded (**) to run these regressions. 
 
1. Gender of respondent.  0 for female and 1 for male 
 
2. Where would you place YOURSELF on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about 
this?   (**Recoded using seven point scale and extremely conservative scoring at 1 and 
extremely liberal scoring at 7.) 
 1 extremely liberal 
 2 liberal 
 3 slightly liberal 
 4 moderate; middle of the road 
 5 slightly conservative 
 6 conservative 
 7 extremely conservative 
 
3. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a [DEMOCRAT, a 
REPUBLICAN/ a REPUBLICAN, a DEMOCRAT], an INDEPENDENT, or what? 
(**Recoded using standard seven point scale with Strong Republican scoring at 1 and 
strong Democrat scoring at 7.   -2=.  All other values are coded as missing.)   
0 no preference 
1 democrat 
2 republican 
3 independent 
5 other party (specify) 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
 
4. Do you FAVOR or OPPOSE laws to protect gays and lesbians against job 
discrimination? (**Recoded with -9=.   -8=.   -1=.   5=0, 4=1, 2=2, 1=3  Strongly favor, 
favor, don’t care, oppose, strongly oppose)  
1 favor 
2 oppose 
-1 inapplicable 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
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5. Do you favor such laws STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY?/ Do you oppose such laws 
STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY?  (**Recoded with -9=.   -8=.   -1=.) 
1 strongly 
2 not strongly 
-1 inapplicable 
-8 don’t know 
-9  refused 
 
6. SUMMARY REV version—favor laws against gays/lesbians job discrimination.  
(**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  -1=.  5=0, 4=1, 2=2, 1=3)  
1 approve strongly 
2 approve not strongly 
3 disapprove not strongly 
4 disapprove strongly 
-1 inapplicable 
-8 don’t know 
-9  refused 
 
7. Do you FAVOR or OPPOSE laws to protect homosexuals against job discrimination? 
(**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  -1=. ) 
1 favor 
2 oppose 
-1 inapplicable 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
 
8. Do you favor such laws STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY?/ Do you oppose such laws 
STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY?  (**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  -1=. ) 
1 strongly 
2 not strongly 
-1 inapplicable 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
 
9. SUMMARY STD version—favor laws against gays/lesbians job discrimination  
(**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  -1=.  5=0, 4=1, 2=2, 1=3)  
1 approve strongly 
2 approve not strongly 
3 disapprove not strongly 
4 disapprove strongly 
-1 inapplicable 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
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10.  SUMMARY REV version-favor laws against gays/lesbians job discrimination 
 (Recoded 5=0, 4=1, 2=2, 1=3) 
 1 approve strongly 
 2 approve not strongly 
 4 disapprove not strongly 
 5 disapprove strongly 
-1 inapplicable 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
 
11.  Do you think gays and lesbians should be allowed to serve in the United States Armed 
Forces or don’t you think so? 
 (**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  -1=.  2=0) 
 1 gays and lesbians should be allowed to serve 
2 gays and lesbians should not be allowed to serve 
-1 inapplicable 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
 
12. [Do you feel STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY that gays and lesbians should be 
allowed to serve? / Do you feel STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY that gays and 
lesbians should not be allowed to serve?]     (**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  -1=.  ) 
1 strongly 
2 no strongly 
-1 inapplicable 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
 
13. SUMMARY REV version- allow gays/lesbians serve in US armed forces 
 (**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  -1=.  5=0, 4=1, 2=2, 1=3) 
1 feel strongly that gays and lesbians should be allowed to serve 
2 feel not strongly that gays and lesbians should be allowed to serve 
4 feel not strongly that gays and lesbians should not be allowed to serve 
5 feel strongly that gays and lesbians should not be allowed to serve 
-1 inapplicable 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
 
14. Do you think homosexuals should be allowed to serve in the United States Armed Forces 
or don’t you think so? 
 (**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  -1=.  ) 
1 homosexuals should be allowed to serve 
2 homosexuals should not be allowed to serve 
-1 inapplicable 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
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15. Do you feel STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY that homosexuals should be allowed to 
serve?/ Do you feel STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY that homosexuals should not be 
allowed to serve? 
 (**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  -1=. ) 
1 strongly 
2 not strongly 
-1 inapplicable 
-8 don’t know 
-9  refused 
 
16. SUMMARY STD version—allow gays/lesbians serve in US armed forces 
 (**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  -1=.  5=0, 4=1, 2=2. 1=3) 
1 feel strongly that homosexuals should be allowed to serve 
2 feel not strongly that homosexuals should be allowed to serve 
3 feel not strongly that homosexuals should not be allowed to serve 
4 feel strongly that homosexuals should not be allowed to serve 
-1 inapplicable 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
 
17. Do you think gay or lesbian couples should be legally permitted to adopt children? 
 (**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  2=0) 
1 yes 
2 no 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
 
18. Looking at page [preload: prepg z] of the booklet.  Which comes closest to your view? 
You can just tell me the number of your choice. 
 (**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  -1=.  3=0, 2=1, 1=2) 
1 gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to legally marry. 
2 gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to form civil unions but not legally 
marry 
3 there should be no legal recognition of a gay or lesbian couple’s relationship. 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
 
19. Now on another topic…Do you consider religion to be an IMPORTANT part of your life, 
or NOT? 
 (**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  -1=.  2=1) 
1 important 
2 not important 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
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20. Would you say your religion provides [SOME guidance in your day-to-day living, 
QUITE A BIT of guidance, or a GREAT DEAL of guidance/ a GREAT DEAL of 
guidance in your day-to-day living, QUITE A BIT of guidance, or SOME guidance] in 
your day-to-day life?   (**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  -1=0)   
1 some 
2 quite a bit 
3 a great deal 
-1 inapplicable 
-8 don’t know 
-9  refused 
 
21. Please look at page [preload: prepg r]/[preload: prepg b] of the booklet.  People practice 
their religion in different ways.  Outside of attending religious services, do you pray 
[SEVERAL TIMES A DAY, ONCE A DAY, A FEW TIMES A WEEK, ONCE A 
WEEK OR LESS or NEVER/NEVER, ONCE A WEEK OR LESS, A FEW TIMES A 
WEEK, ONCE A DAY, or SEVERAL TIMES A DAY]? 
 (**Recoded  95=.  -9=.  -8=.  5=0, 4=1, 3=2, 2=3, 1=4) 
01 several times a day 
02 once a day 
03 a few times a week 
04 once a week or less 
05 never 
95 other (vol) (specify) 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
 
22. Please look at page [preload: prepg s] of booklet.  Which of these statements comes 
closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?  You can just give me the number of 
your choice. 
 (**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  5=.    3=0, 2=1, 1=2) 
1 the bible is the actual word of god and is to be taken literally, word for word. 
2 the bible is the word of god but not everything in it should be taken literally, word 
for word.  
3 the bible is a book written by men and is not the word of god 
5 other (specify) (vol) 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
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23. Do you go to religious services [EVERY WEEK, ALMOST EVERY WEEK, ONCE OR 
TWICE A MONTH, A FEW TIMES A YEAR, or NEVER/ NEVER, A FEW TIMES A 
YEAR, ONCE OR TWICE A MONTH, ALMOST EVERY WEEK, or EVERY 
WEEK]? 
 (**Recoded -9=.   -1=0, 5=0, 4-1, 3=2, 2=3, 1=4)   
1 every week 
2 almost every week 
3 once or twice a month 
4 a few times a year 
5 never 
-1 inapplicable 
-9 refused 
 
24. Would you call yourself a born-again Christian, that is, have you personally had a 
conversion experience related to Jesus Christ? 
 (**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  -1=0, 2=0) 
1 yes 
2 no 
-1 inapplicable 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
 
 
25. SUMMARY- R race and ethnicity group (**Recoded -9=.  -8=. ) 
1 white non-hispanic 
2 black non-hispanic 
3 hispanic 
4 other non-hispanic 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
 
26. PRE: SUMMARY-R level of highest education (group) (**Recoded -9=.  -2=.) 
1 less than high school credential 
2 high school credential 
3 some post-high-school, no bachelor’s 
4 bachelor’s degree 
5 graduate degree 
-2 missing, other not codeable to 1-5 
-9 refused 
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27. CASI/WEB: SUMMARY—Pre family income (see also: inc-group_prepost) 
(**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  -2=.)  Not sure as -9, -2  and -8 do not appear here.  
01 under $5,000 
02 $5,000-9,999 
03 $10,000-$12,499 
04 $12,500-$14,999 
05 $15,000-17,499 
06 $17,500-$19,999 
07 $20,000-$22,499 
08 $22,500-$24,499 
09 $25, 000-$27,499 
10 $27,500-$29,999 
11 $30,000-$34,499 
12 $35,000-$39,999 
13 $40,000-$44,999 
14 $45,000-$49,999 
15 $50,000-$54,999 
16 $55,000-$59,999 
17 $60,000-$64,999 
18 $65,000-$69,999 
19 $70,000-$74,999 
20 $75,000-$79,999 
21 $80,000-$89,999 
22 $90,000-$99,999 
23 $100,000-$109,999 
24 $110,000-$124,999 
25 $125,000-$149,999 
26 $150,000-$174,999 
27 $175,000-$249,999 
28 $250,000 or more 
 
28. Do you consider yourself to be heterosexual or straight, homosexual or gay, or 
bisexual?/Do you consider yourself to be heterosexual or straight, homosexual or gay or 
lesbian, or bisexual?  (**Recoded -9=.  -8=. ) 
1 heterosexual or straight 
2 homosexual or gay (or lesbian) 
3 bisexual 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
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29. Among your immediate family members, relatives, neighbors, coworkers, or close friends, 
are any of them gay, lesbian, or bisexual as far as you know? 
 (**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  2=0) 
1 yes 
2 no 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
 
30. Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have: 
INDEPENDENCE or RESPECT FOR ELDERS.   
 (**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  -7=.  -6=.  1=0  3=1  4=1) 
1 independence 
2 respect for elders 
3 both (vol) 
4 neither (vol) 
-6 not asked, unit nonresponse (no post-election interview) 
-7 deleted due to partial (post election interview) 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
 
31. (Which one is more important for a child to have:) CURIOSITY or GOOD MANNERS? 
 (**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  -7=.  -6=.  1=0  3=1  4=1 ) 
1 curiosity 
2 good manners 
3 both (vol) 
-6 not asked, unit nonresponse (no post-election interview) 
-7 deleted due to partial (post-election interview) 
-8 don’t know 
-9  refused 
 
32. (Which one is more important for a child to have:) OBEDIENCE or SELF-RELIANCE 
 (**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  -7=.  -6=.  1=2  3=1  4=1  2=0) 
1 obedience 
2 self-reliance 
3 both (vol) 
4 neither (vol) 
-6 not asked, unit nonresponse (no post-election interview) 
-7 deleted due to partial (post-election interview) 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
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33. (Which one is more important for a child to have:) BEING CONSIDERATE or WELL 
BEHAVED?   (**Recoded -9=.  -8=.  -7=.  -6=.  1=0  3=1  4=1)   
1 being considerate 
2 well behaved 
3 both (vol) 
-6 not asked, unit nonresponse (no post-election interview) 
-7 deleted due to partial (post-election interview) 
-8 don’t know 
-9 refused 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
